Reappraising the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Senator Yuen Pau Woo
Heading into 2024, there are four key questions to consider about Ottawa’s flagship foreign policy initiative:
What is the analytic or operational value of a strategy that is framed as “Indo-Pacific”?
Unlike “Asia Pacific” or “East Asia”, which have institutional expression through regional organizations (e.g. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC) and free trade agreements, as well as business-driven regional production networks that bind many of the countries together, the concept of “Indo-Pacific” seeks to fuse two sub-regions (South Asia and East Asia) where economic integration is nascent.
The idea of an Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) may make sense as a geopolitical concept focused on maritime security, but there is no similar logic in treating the region as a coherent economic unit with common strategies for expanding trade and investment with the constituent countries. Canada should develop strategies for deeper economic relations with say India, Korea and Indonesia, but there is no one-size-fits-all strategy that applies to the Indo-Pacific as a whole.
If anything, the insistence on using an Indo-Pacific vector as a demonstration of Canada’s commitment to deeper economic ties with the region can end up undermining our credibility with individual countries that are more interested in knowing the economic initiatives Ottawa has in mind for them.
How is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy different from that of the United States?
An Indo-Pacific framework that is heavy on military-security alignment with the United States, such as increased deployment of air and naval assets in the western Pacific, and light on measures to develop trade and investment with specific Asian markets, will further undermine the credibility of Canada’s IPS, especially among members of ASEAN. While it may be politically expedient for Canada to seek membership in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), doing so will reinforce the view in much of the region that Ottawa is pursuing a lightweight version of the U.S. IPEF and has little to offer the region that is unique. The IPEF “pillars” do not include market access, which is the priority for most Asian countries.
How does China fit into the Strategy?
By describing the PRC as a “disruptive” power in its IPS, Canada has come out more strongly against Beijing than countries that are geographically proximate to China. Ottawa has thus created for itself an unnecessary hurdle that impedes the beneficial recalibration of bilateral relations that have been at a low point for at least three years.
While western peer group countries like the U.S. and Australia have restored some high-level contacts with Beijing, Canada has had only one minister visit China in recent years – a visit that was widely criticized by opposition politicians and the media. Perhaps the “pragmatic” foreign policy approach recently articulated by Minister Melanie Joly expresses a “spirit” that is willing to re-open lines of communication, but the “flesh” of the Canadian body politic remains weak in its ability to follow through. The domestic politics of alleged foreign (i.e. Chinese) interference in Canada’s democracy, fueled almost exclusively by anonymous leaks from within the security and intelligence establishment, has made rapprochement with China a political poison. The situation is unlikely to improve before the next general election.
Whither Canada’s IPS?
An IPS that seeks to avoid or exclude China will effectively mean a diminution of Canada’s presence in the region. This is true not only because of the size of China’s market but also because Chinese enterprises are ubiquitous across Asia. While there may have been a slim prospect of economic ties with India compensating for losses in the Chinese market, that prospect has been set back by the ongoing diplomatic chill between Ottawa and New Delhi.
The reality is that Ottawa’s signature policy pivot of the last year was not the IPS; it was the embrace of a continentalist (i.e. North American) economic strategy that is based on ill-defined concepts such as friend-shoring, and a no-holds-barred effort to be included under protectionist laws in the U.S. such as the Inflation Reduction Act. Even though the IPS was intended to reduce Canada’s dependence on traditional export markets, the great irony is that it will – on the current trajectory – make us even more dependent on the U.S. market than we are today.
Published by the Canada West Foundation in Issue 100 of the China Brief: China, the Indo-Pacific and Canada’s West.