Senator Yuen Pau Woo

Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Implementation Bill

Second Reading

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Gignac, seconded by the Honourable Senator Aucoin, for the second reading of Bill C-18, An Act to implement the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Canada and Indonesia.

Hon. Yuen Pau Woo: Honourable senators, I would like to add my voice to the debate on Bill C-18.

Senator Gignac has done an excellent job of describing the agreement and explaining why it is important for the Canadian and Indonesian economies.

As trade agreements go, this one is relatively uncomplicated. And as with all such agreements, success will be determined by how businesses in Canada and Indonesia respond. If the bill passes — as I hope it does — that will be the easy part. The hard work will be in convincing entrepreneurs and business leaders to seek out the opportunities that this deal opens for our two countries. But this agreement is not just about trade. It is about how Canada positions itself in a world that is no longer organized around a single centre of power.

Insofar as Canada is seeking to diversify its economic relationships beyond the United States, Indonesia and the countries of Southeast Asia are priority markets. Prime Minister Carney has talked about a new foreign policy approach based on variable geometry. In practical terms, this means working with different partners on different issues — trade here, security there and climate elsewhere — without assuming alignment across all domains. By any measure, Indonesia is a major variable in a foreign policy based on variable geometry. Let me tell you why.

For over a millennium, the powers in and around modern-day Indonesia have shaped the region and influenced global trade. Between the 7th and 13th centuries, the Sumatra-based Srivijaya empire was the dominant force in Southeast Asia and was an important bridge for the transmission of Buddhism between India and East Asia. It was replaced by the mostly Hindu Majapahit empire, which was based in Java.

Majapahit rule was over by the 16th century, soon to be replaced by Portuguese overlords who were interested in the so‑called Spice Islands of Maluku. They were eclipsed by the Dutch in the 17th century who, through the Dutch East India Company, monopolized the global spice trade for nearly 200 years.

The spice trade was, in many ways, the first example of economic globalization, and a nascent Indonesia was at the centre of it. Indonesia’s strategic importance in the world economy has continued to this day. This is not a new story. It is a return to Indonesia’s historic centrality. It is the fourth-largest country in the world by population and the largest majority Muslim nation.

As you have already learned from Senator Gignac, Indonesia consists of about 17,000 islands — 7,000 of which are inhabited. Most Canadians who have been to Indonesia have probably visited only two of those islands: Java and Bali.

From east to west, Indonesia spans a distance of about 5,000 kilometres, about the same as the distance from Boundary Peak 186 in the Yukon to Cape Spear in Newfoundland. Indonesia is strategically located on the southern edge of continental Asia and borders both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. More importantly, it is one of two countries that control the narrow body of water connecting the two oceans: the Strait of Malacca. If you thought a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was problematic for the world economy, imagine a blockade of the Strait of Malacca, which is important not only for the passage of oil and gas but also container and bulk cargo vessels.

Since attaining independence in 1945, Indonesia has been an influential player in international affairs, and under President Prabowo Subianto, it appears the country is poised to play an even more important role in the years ahead. Here are just a few examples.

Indonesia hosted the Asian-African Conference of non-aligned states in 1955, more popularly known as the Bandung Conference. Bandung was Indonesia’s declaration that newly independent states could shape world politics on their own terms, not as clients of great powers but as collective actors. Indonesia and the other countries at Bandung were ahead of their time, but they correctly captured the sentiment of countries in what is now called the Global South in the early years of decolonization.

This sentiment has intensified in recent years and has seen expression in international fora, such as BRICS and the G20. Indeed, Indonesia became a full member of BRICS in 2025 and is the only permanent Southeast Asian member of the G20. Senator Gignac has already pointed out that Indonesia is also seeking membership in the OECD — variable geometry, indeed.

Indonesia is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. That was back in 1967 when ASEAN was still a Cold War grouping with only five members who were mostly concerned about the spread of Communism from the war in Vietnam. Today, ASEAN consists of 11 members, including Vietnam, and is one of the most durable and effective subregional groupings in the world.

While ASEAN operates by consensus, Indonesia is seen by many as the unofficial leader of the group, with the ASEAN Secretariat located in Jakarta. Canada recognizes what is called “ASEAN centrality” in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is an acknowledgement of Southeast Asia’s importance in the changing world order. For Canada, this is not simply a market; it is a gateway into one of the most consequential regions of the 21st century.

In his Davos speech, Mr. Carney admitted to the double standards of the old world order and the emergence of a more multipolar world order that necessitates a more independent foreign policy for Canada and greater diversity in our international economic relations.

The countries of ASEAN, and Indonesia in particular, have long been aware of geopolitics, superpower competition and the importance of strategic autonomy. As we embark on our own path toward greater foreign policy independence, we could learn a thing or two from Indonesia, which has championed balance and agency in its foreign relations. Some scholars describe Indonesia’s international relations as “promiscuous,” which is not a word I would use officially for our own foreign policy strategy, but the idea of hedging our bets across different partners is correct. Indonesia and other ASEAN countries are often called “swing states” in the international order, and it behooves us to find opportunities to “swing” with those countries on issues that matter to them and to us.

If Canada wants to be relevant in Southeast Asia, it must take ASEAN seriously, not just rhetorically but operationally.

Indonesia is an active contributor to global governance reform and should be seen as a vital partner, not only in bilateral and minilateral settings but also in the reform and renewal of the multilateral system, including the UN system; the World Trade Organization, or WTO; and international financial institutions.

At the UN, Indonesia is an advocate for Security Council reform and greater recognition of a more multipolar world. In the WTO, Indonesia chairs the Group of 33, or G33, which focuses on smallholder agricultural producers in developing countries and is actively trying to revive the Appellate Body. Indonesia has also called for an increase in the voting power and representation of developing countries in decision-making processes at both the IMF and the World Bank to reflect contemporary economic realities.

We may not align with Indonesia on all these issues, but to ignore their influence on the evolving architecture of global governance would be a grave mistake.

Indonesia is a leading contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, with over 2,700 peacekeepers deployed across various missions around the world, compared to Canada, which has none. Three Indonesian peacekeepers were recently killed in southern Lebanon while on active duty. There is a tendency in Canada to rely on legacy narratives, such as our historic role in UN peacekeeping, but we could learn some lessons from Indonesia about matching rhetoric with action.

At its core, honourable colleagues, the Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement is less about tariffs and more about building trust between the two countries. It is also a pathway to strengthening bilateral relations across other domains. In that sense, the agreement is a signal for Canadians to pay more attention to Indonesia and vice versa. Whether it is through research partnerships, student mobility, tourism or cultural exchanges, we need more Indonesia, and Indonesia needs more Canada.

That is why I am pleased to inform you that Senator Gignac and I will, with your support, reactivate a Canada-Indonesia parliamentary friendship group. There have been a few Indonesian parliamentary delegations to Canada in recent years, and there is interest on the part of Indonesian parliamentarians in more regular contact with Canadian counterparts. You will be interested to know that the Indonesian parliament, known as the People’s Consultative Assembly, consists of two chambers: The House of Representatives holds primary legislative power while the Regional Representative Council acts as an advisory upper house focused on regional issues. Does that sound familiar? Stay tuned for an invitation to be charter members of this parliamentary friendship group.

Honourable colleagues, this agreement will not only boost trade and investment between Canada and Indonesia but also demonstrate Canada’s commitment to the region. This agreement is not just a trade deal; it is a signal that Canada is prepared to show up in the world as it is, not as it once was. I support sending this bill to committee as soon as possible.

Thank you.